THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE STATE OF
PENNSYLVANIA.
Disappointed attorneys have been heard to remark that
when the Court had found there was no real reason to defeat
their contention it based its decision upon "public policy". That
expression is indeed very vaguely used--.like charity, it covereth
a multitude of sins.
Public Policy has been defined as "the principle of law which
holds that no one can lawfully do that which has a tendency to
be injurious to the public or against "the public good", and again
it has been said that public policy is "the principle under which
freedom of contract or private dealing is restricted by law for the
good of the community". 1 The latter of these definitions is too
narrow, for public policy is not merely a principle of the law of
contracts, but extends to a variety of branches of the law. Both
definitions are vague. Without attempting as yet to define our
subject, let us, after considering both the above definitions, ask
the question, what is injurious to the public and what is public
good? As soon as these questions are put into words, we find
nothing has been gained by defining public policy in the above
language. If regard. for the public good were made the sole
basis of the resolution of the court, its decisions today would
vary more from those of fifty years ago than they do under present conditions, for the ideas of public good and public injury
vary as we progress in public wisdom, just as we make material
progress more rapidly than does the conservative common law.
Therefore if we were to take the above definitions literally, we
would find we had wholly overlooked the principle of stare
dccisis.
Another limitation, not expressed in the above definitions,
is that the principle of public policy is one of unwritten law. We
must therefore concltide that our definitions lack two essentials;
firstly, that the principle of stare decisis limits the principle of
public policy; and, secondly, that the statute law limits the principle of public policy. In regard to the last statement-which-is
l9
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not perfectly self evident-it should be noted, that when any
rule of public policy is placed upon the statute books, it ceases to
be a rule of public policy and becomes a matter of legislative policy.. We are, therefore, probably safe in saying that the term
public policy denotes the policy of the courts controlling matters
which are not the subject of substantive law or of statute, and
that such policy once declared will, usually, be followed.
Thus far we have merely cleared the ground. We have not
advanced toward securing an answer to our question just what is
public policy in the State of Pennsylvania. From a careful classification of the decisions of the. Supreme Court dealing with this
subject, the following generalizations may be made. The public
policy of the State of Pennsylvania is addressed to, (I) The
preservation of the government; (2) The protection of the administration of justice; (3) The preservation of the Christian
religion; (4)The maintenance of public decency; (5)The maintenance of our present customs in regard to the relations of the
sexes, or, more specifically, the preservation of the marriage relation; (6) The regulation of private business in accordance
with the courts' conception of business morality.
What right the courts have to set up standards of conduct in
any of the cases above enumerated except the first two is a question that cannot be answered. It is beyond the scope of this inquiry. We need only consider the fact that such standards have
been established. The first two objects of public policy are justifiable, if at all, by the same arguments which justify stable government.
Let us consider seriatim each of the above divisions of our
subject with the idea of ascertaining the extent of the principles.
THE PRESERVATION OF THE GOVERNMENT.
Traffic in public office is contrary to public policy. 'This
generalization is to be drawn from four decisions of the Supreme
Court. In Filson v. Hines2 it was held that a contact with an
entir'e consideration-a part of the promise being that the promisor should use his influence to secure the promisee an appoint'5 Pa. 452

(1846).
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ment as postmaster-was unenforcible because part of the promise was contrary to public policy. Gibson, C. J., did not base his
decision upon the reason that traffic in public office is contrary to
the whole spirit of representative government, but relied upon
the analogy of the case before him to earlier cases from other
jurisdictions.
In Hunter v. Wolfs the Supreme Court decided that a contract between two aspirants to the office of federal assessor that
one should withdraw his candidacy and the other, if appointed,
would divide the profits of the office, was void. Mr. Justice
Sharswood, who delivered the opinion of the court, assumed the
point in controversy and stated no reasons for the application of
the ban of public policy. Again in Wilkes-Barre v. RockafeIlo7w'4 it was held that a contract in consideration of a promise of
election to office was invalid. Mr. Justice ,Villiams simply says
such an agreement is contrary to public policy. And in Fahnestock v. Clark- it was held that a trial of the right to a public office could not be effected by a feigned issue upon a case stated
because such a course is contrary to public policy. No reason is
given for the application of the ban.
It was held as early as 1843 in Clippingcr v. Hcplaugh"
that a contract to influence legislators to pass a special act of assembly is void. Speaking of services in securing an enactment,
Mr. Justice Rogers said:
"We do not say, it is not necessary to the case, to say, that
a certain compensation for such services may not be recovered,
but we are clearly of opinion that it would be against sound policy to sanction a practice which may lead, to secret, improper
and corrupt tampering with legislative action.
. .
"It is of first consequence that they [the members of the
legislature] should not be deceived, that they should be protected from the arts and misrepresentations of designing men,
having an interest to mislead them from the paths of duty. It
is, therefore, most erroneous to assume, as it is generally by the
plaintiff's counsel, that a practice, leading to such consequences,
'7 Pa. 282 (872),
417 Pa. 177 (1895),
&24 Pa. 5ot (i8ss),
'5 W. & s. 315,.
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is not contrary to private interests and public morals. The reverse is too true; for already a class of persons has arisen, at
the seat of the general government and elsewhere, who make it
a business to push private claims for a compensation greatly, if
not entirely, dependent upon success. How demoralizing this
may be, it needs not the gift of prophecy to foretell, nay, more,
we feel its effects, for it is impossible to shut our eyes at the consequence of these, and other causes, daily developing themselves
in the decline of justice and public morals. How easy the
transition from private individuals to the members themselves,
it would not be difficult to divine, but we are not left to conjecture, for we are not without examples, which it would be invidious to mention, but which are too well known. '"
In Bowman v. Gofroth8 it was decided that it is illegal, because contrary to public policy, to undertake to secure the discharge of a man who had been drafted into the army. Mr. Justice Reed, speaking for the court, said:
"The cases . . . establish that a contract to procure a
pardon from the Governor, of a convict, would now be held illegal; whether improper means were used or not ;' so, to procure the passage of a private statute, or, to procure an appointment to office by private influence, or, to purchase tle right ot
administration, are held to be illegal and void."
In Holdship v. Jaudon1 ° the Supreme Court decided that a
contract to violate a public duty is void, but that a bond conditioned to do a thing contrary to a maxim of law is a single obligation. This ruling was carried to its logical conclusion in
Koons v. Seward"1 in which the court held that a bond given to
a plaintiff in a capias ad respondendum, conditioned to produce
TSo also in Ormerod v. Dearman, Ioo Pa. .56 (882) and Spalding v.
Ewing, r49 Pa. 375 (x892), the Supreme Court decided that any interference
with the creating of legislation is contrary to public policy.
'59 Pa. 19 (1868).
•Hatzfield v. Guldon, 7 Watts, 152 (i838)-"No man would say that if it
were possible to procure a pardon by a direct payment to the Governor, it
would be lawful to give one. To bribe others, to deceive and impose upon
him, only differs in degree." And a contract to corrupt the officers of a
private corporation is void, Weckerly v. Lutheran Congregation, 3 Rawle, 172
(1831).
x6 S. & R. 3o7 (x827).
118 Watts, 388 (1839).
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the defendant, is an absolute obligation and not contrary to pub12
lic policy.
It would seem, on principle, that the preservation of the
government depends in part upon government officials being
compensated according to law, neither more nor less. The resolution of the Supreme Court in Lancaster County v. Fulton1 3
that to compensate a public officer in excess of his lawful emolu1
ments is contrary to public policy is, therefore, not surprising. '
But in Fulton v. Lancaster County" the Supreme Court distinguished the previous case and held that where a public officer,
after the expiration of his term of office, is re-employed by the
proper county authorities to carry on a special duty, he may be
compensated in excess of his legal remuneration. As it has been
held that to increase the salary of a public officer, is contrary to
public policy, so on the other hand it has been held, in other jurisdictions, that to diminish their salaries by attachments is contrary to public policy, but in Pennsylvania that rule is based upon
a different consideration.
Mandamus and indeed any other process of law will be denied where the objects sought to be obtained thereby are contrary to public policy. Mr. Justice Gordon in Sterrett v. Electric Reporting Co.a" said:
"The writ of mandamus is not of right, but its issue is for
the sound discretion of the court, and it ought never to be
granted where the object sought to be attained is an immoral
one or of pernicious or immoral tendency or against public
policy."
" Itwas held, in Fox v. Cash, It Pa. 207 (z849), that it is not contrary
to public policy for a county clerk to purchase lands sold at public sale for
arrears of taxes: but in Weeks v. Lippencott, 42 Pa. 474 (0862), it was held
to be contrary to public policy to pay money to a man for withdrawing his
opposition to the opening of a road through his property.
2*128 Pa. 48 (sS8).
uTo the same effect is McCandless v. Allegheny Bessemer Steel Company, 152 Pa. 139 (893), although a distinction was there drawn and it
was decided that to compensate a deputy sheriff for special services is not
contrary to public policy.
"162 Pa. 294 (1894).
i19 Phila. Rep. 3W (887).
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It sounds antique in these days of democracy seriously to
discuss state secrets, but it was held in Gray v. Pentland1 7 that
the courts would not enforce the revelation of secret state documents. 18
PROTECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

It is obvious that the policy of the courts should be opposed
to any obstruction of public justice. It was early held that an
agreement to stifle a criminal prosecution is yoid. 19 The Penal
Code subsequently defined the rights of individuals in this respect. 20

However it is not contrary to public

policy for one

to go bail for another and to take pay for so doing.2 1
Obstructing justice is also the basis of the line of decisions
which hold that a stipulation in a contract which ousts the jurisdiction of the courts is void.2 2 It is difficult to see how this doctrine could be extended beyond the facts of the cited case. In
that case there was a stipulation written into the contract that
any action on it must be brought in a court of a certain county
named in the contract. This would be impossible of enforcement for it could not give the courts of that. county jurisdiction
if they had none nor could it oust the jurisdiction of some other
court lawfully acquired.
The proceedings of jurors cannot be made the subject of inquiry; for it is against public policy to subject jurors to such
search. In Quinn v. CrowelP3 the Supreme Court resolved that
a juror could not be examined as a witness concerning the reason for which a majority of the jury favored one side or the
other, nor what was the charge of the court. Neither is the testimony of jurors admissible to impeach their verdict. In Clug"2 S. & L 22 (1815).
"Hartranfts Appeal, 8s Pa. 433 (877), is to the same effect.
"Stout v. Rassel, 2 Yeates, 334 (1798). "
"Act of 31st March, x86o, P. L 382, §o, makes an agreement to compound a felony unlawful. And Act of 13th of March, i86o, P. L.
,
provides that a prosecution for a misdemeanor may be settled. Riddle v.
Hall, o9 Pa. xi6 (z88z), Pearce v. Wilson, iii Pa. 14 (1886).
I Bing v. Wiley, z46 Pa. 38z (18g).
"Healy v. Building and- Loan Association, i7 Pa. Super. Ct. 385 (xgo).
34 Wharton, 334 (839).
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gage v. Suaan 2' Mr. Justice Yeates deliyered a lengthy
and lucid
opinion upon this point, saying in part:
"Independently of all authorities on the subject,
fest that the finding of a jury should be the result it is maniof their impartial and unprejudiced judgment according to the
evidence.
The decision of a contested case by lot must be reprobated
by
every honest man. . . . The difficulty which
here presents
itself is how shall the fact be established? Shall one
or more of
the jurors be permitted by their voluntary affidavits
to
ascertain
that they and their fellows have so grossly misbehaved
selves and perverted the very object of their high office? them. . .
I frankly confess that I feel the utmost repugnance
to such testimony, although I am fully aware that thereby I
exclude almost the only evidence which the case naturally admits
by admitting it, I as readily perceive, that I should of. But
door to the exercise of the most pernicious arts, and open the
with jurors and the practice would be replete with tampering
dangerous
consequences. Jurors who have been sworn or solemnly
affirmed to give a verdict according to the evidence
grace into a tribunal of justice to prove their owncome with bad
dishonorable
conduct and affix a stigma on their companions who
may be unheard in their defence. . .
But above all I greatly fear that
the practice if adopted would tend to an inquisition
over the
consciences of jurors as to the grounds and reasons
of their verdict and bring questions of fact more frequently
before the
court for their dedisions than is consistent with sound
policy.
244 Binney,

iso (i8rr).
The rule here under discussion has
considered recently in Commonwealth v. Bergdoll, 55 Pa. Super. Ct. 186been
(r913). - In that case Judge Swartz,
whose opinion was affirmed per curiamn by the Superior
Court, said:
"Two affidavits were presented, made by
one of the jurors, and a third
was made by a member of the bar who heard
this
juror make a statement.
It is claimed that these affidavits show that the jurors
took into consideration a matter that was not in evidence, and that they
were influenced by it in
rendering their verdict.
did
."We
not allow these ex trte affidavits to
impeach his verdict by this method, then a trial be filed. If a juror may
is of little consequence
and few verdicts could stand. The court would
kept busy in retrying the
same case. Out of a panel of -twelve men any be
persistent attorney is likely
to find one juror who can give some plausible irrelevant
matter as an excuse
for not finding a verdict as counsel would prefer to
have it.
"The rule of law, that one juror, by his deposition,
cannot be allowed
to impeach the verdict of the jury on the ground that
some other juror used
an unfair argument before his fellows, is well established.
The rile goes so
far, that a juror's testimony is not admissible as to
what transpired in the
deliberation of the jury acting as an organized
body in the performance of its
official
"It duty.
is clearly against public policy to
admit such evidence. A relaxation
of the rule would subject the jurors to the importunities
and inquiries of
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. . The settled rule in New York and Virginia as well as the
most modern English authorities are adverse to receiving such
testimony and I cannot discover why we should be more inattentive to the reputation and feelings of our own jurors."'"
Cluggage v. Swan has been limited by Huidecoper v. Cotton 20 where it was held that a grand juror might be permitted to
testify who was the prosecutor in a bill of indictment which had
been returned ignoramus.
The principle of forbidding a juror to stultify the verdict
27
has been extended somewhat. Thus in Brcchtel v. Cortright
it was held that the sheriff having made a specific return is not a
competent witness to contradict it. But in Stewart v. Chwster &
Darby Road Co. 28 it was decided that an arbitrator is not disqualified to testify as to the physical condition of a plaintiff
whose case had been tried before arbitrators. Nor is a person
to be excluded as a witness in a road case because he had been
29
one of the viewers.
While the jury system was originally founded upon the
theory that the jury of the vicinage ought to be acquainted with
the facts and therefore come to a true saying (verdict), it is
customary today-particularly in criminal cases-to endeavor to
exclude from the jury all persons who know anything about the
case. While it was held in Howser v. Commonwealth"0 that a
juror is a competent witness either in a civil or criminal case, Mr.
Chief Justice Woodward said: "As to material witnesses, those,
we mean, upon whose testimony the event is essentially dependant, we think they ought not to be admitted to the jury box."
This principle he bases upon sound policy, not upon the constituinterested parties, after the verdict, and involve the jurors in controversies
among themselves as to what actually occurred in the jury room. with a
possible tendency to perjury."

'As to the case of Bradley v. Bradley, 4 Dallas, 112 (1792), which seems
to be contrar-, to Cluggage v. Swan, Mr. Justice Yeates says (p. i56): "That
case is reported erroneously. I was of counsel with the plaintiff."
%3 Watts, 56 (x834).
V 13 Pa. Super. Ct. 384 (igoo).
3 Pa. Super. Ct. 86 (896).
Plank Road v. Thomas, 20 Pa. 91 (i8Sa).

5s Pa. 332 (x865).
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tional right of the accused to be confronted with the witness
against him.81
While the courts have been very tender to jurors and have
refused to permit the sheriff to contradict his return, they have,
in spite of their professed tenderness toward arbitrators, been
rather strict with them.
It was not always so, for in Wade v. Gallagher32 it was resolved, after long argument, that referees could not be examined
as to their proceedings. "You may examine referees as to a
plain simple point, as, did they allow interest on an unsettled
account, or the like, but to go further would supersede the use of
all references." The thought thus expressed was still influential
with the court in Ellmaker v. Buckley3 S wherein it was decided
that an arbitrator was not only not competent to give evidence of
his own misconduct and that of his brethren, but that he might
not testify to the misconduct of one of the parties before him, if
such evidence, at the same time, involved the misconduct of the
arbitrators.
This line of cases ends with Ellmaker v. Buckley. Two
years later a different influence enters and Roop v. Brubacker3 '
is the opening wedge. It was then held that one of the arbitrators was competent to prove that certain matters were not considered by them and that consequently their award was a mistake. "To put the sanctity of an award on the highest ground
ever assumed, it is no greater than a judgment of a court; but a
judgment is not conclusive of any matter not in contest and not
decided on." It is true that in this case the amount of land in
dispute had never been questioned before the arbitrators and
that "one of the arbitrators who re-surveyed it was as competent a witness as any other man, to prove the real quantity"
which is perfectly sound; but the learned judge adds-purely by
way of dictum-what was not the law in Pennsylvania when he
Yet in Harper v. Kean, rx S. & R. 280 (1824), a witness who had been
examined before the arbitrators in the first trial of the cause was sworn as
a juror, and the judgment was affirmed.
=1 Yeates, 77 (1791).
a 16 S. & P. 71 (1827).
" i Rawle, 304 (Ifa9).
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said it, "the arbitrators may be examined to prove whether a
matter was acted on by them or to prove a mistake made by
them".
In Pert v.Cohen"5 the plaintiff called one of the arbitrators
merely to prove the submission and the award. On cross-examination, he was asked whether or not the arbitrators had not, prior
to the award, decided that they could make no award and so notified the parties. This was objected to and the overruling of
the objection was assigned as error on appeal. Mr. Justice Kennedy said:
"The object of the question by the defendant, was, to ascertain from the witness, whether the submission, of which he
spoke in giving his evidence in chief, had not in effect been terminated or put an end to before the award, of which he also testified, was made. Now it is perfectly obvious, that the award
was a mere nullity or in law no award at all, unless a submission
authorizing it was in force or being at the time it was made."
All of this statement is perfectly true, but it is no reply to
Ihe cogent reasoning of Mr. Justice Yeates in Cluggagev. Swane
with which Mr. Justice Kennedy did not de.' T "
9 preserves a remarkable
The report of Graham v. Graham"
opinion by Gibbons, C. J. As to the competency of arbitrators as
witness he says:
"The objection to the competency of the arbitrators and
umpires as witnesses, is unfounded. It is well settled that an
arbitrator may prove facts that came under his notice in the
progress of the proceeding the only question being whether he
is bound to testify.

.

.

. The point is still unsettled and as

it does not arise in the case before us, we say no more than that,
as the witnesses did not refuse-to be sworn, no one else could
object to it."
The statute law, prior to 1887; did not forbid attorneys
from testifying to confidential communications with their cli4 Wharton, 81 0839).
"Supra, note 24.

'Converse v. Colton, 49 Pa. 346 0865), is in line with the cases just
mentioned. It was there decided that an arbitrator is competent to prove
that the award in the proceeding before him was only intended to cover a
small portion of the claim sued before the jury.
U9 Pa. 2S4 (X84).

94

UA'IVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

ents. Before the Evidence Act,3 9 however, public policy forbade
the disclosure of professional secrets. In Beltzhoover v. Blackstock4 0 Mr. Justice Sergeant said:
"As to the other point, the refusal to compel Mr. McDonald to answer the question proposed to him by the defendant, it
seems that he possessed no knowledge on the subject except
what he obtained from his professional .intercourse with the
parties. This it is the privilege of the client he should not be
permitted to divulge. Without such a privilege the confidence
between client and advocate so essential to the administration
of justice would be at an end. It is not necessary there should
be cause depending in court; it is sufficient if the witness were
consulted professionally and acted, or advised as counsel.'4
It is clear that it is of the highest importance that judicial
sales should be untrammelled, for in many cases the judicial sale
is the only means of enforcing a judgment of the court. The
earliest case upon this subject is Myers v. Hodges42 where an administrator contracted to sell a piece of land at a given price. The
case arose prior to the enabling acts which permit administrators to sell their decedent's real estate at private sale. Mr. Justice Sergeant simply points out that the administrator must sell
at public sale and adds "the policy of the law . . . requires
43
that public sales shall be fair and free". In Slingluff v. Ecke
a bidder at sheriff's sale promised to pay a judgment held by
another bidder if the latter would omit bidding and the former
succeeded in purchasing the property. The contract was held
void. Black, J., said:
"Can this contract be enforced? Is it not against public
policy as well as good morals and therefore void? We all think
it is. A debtor, whose property is taken in execution, has a right
to have it sold for the highest price that it will bring."
'Act of 23rd of May, 1887, P. L. r58.
Watts, 20 (1834).
'The doctrine here laid down was affirmed and somewhat broadened in
Moore v. Bray, io Pa. 5T9 0849), and Kaut v. Kessler, 114 Pa. 6o3 (1886),
but the matter has now -been placed on the statute books so that attorneys
are now forbidden to disclose their clients' secrets by statutory enactment and
not by public policy.
42 Watts, 38T (1834).
• ,24 Pa. 472 (I8S).
43
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This reasoning, based, as it is, on the rights of the judgment debtor, seems to have impressed the court in Maffet v.
IjanIS44 where it was decided that a contract between several

judgment creditors, to stifle bidding at a sheriff's sale, which was
agreed to by the execution defendant and all the creditors who
would be affected by the sale was not contrary to public policy.
It is difficult to reconcile this case with previous dicta. Yet in
Barton v. Benson 45 two lien creditors whose judgments together
amounted to more than the value of the land to be sold agreed
to stifle bidding at an Orphans' Court sale, without notifying
the deceased defendant's heirs. Upon this narruw grouna the
court distinguished Maffet v. Ijams4
THE PRESERVATION OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION.

Blackstone tells us, with pride, that Christianity is part of
the common law. The Christianity of King Henry V's time was
very different from the Christianity of today. So was the common law. It is difficult to say which of the two is the more conservative. Few reported decisions, however, made the preservation of the Christian faith the basis of the resolution.
The case of Zeissweiss v. James47 where a trust to found an
infidel institution was struck down, is too familiar to need much
48
elucidation. However in Manners v. PhiladelphiaLibrary Co.
it was held that the mere fact that atheistic books, were, under
the terms of the will, to be kept in the library, did not vitiate the
bequest.
The facts of Knight's Estate4 are interesting. A decedent by his will bequeathed money to the "Friendship Liberal
League", which was an organization opposed to all "isms" and
"1o3 Pa. 266 (883).
ax26 Pa. 431 0889).
"The distinction is fine spun, and either Maffett v. Ijams is right or it
should be overruled. Barton v. Benson draws so fine a distinction that it
would be invidious to call attention to the fact that it is a.per curiam
opinion. Hays' Estate, 159 Pa. 381 (x893), is another per curiam opinion,
following the ruling.
"63 Pa. 465 (1870).
093 Pa. x6S O8o).
a159 Pa. 500 (894).
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devoted to the investigation of the truth. Sometimes lectures
against Christianity were delivered at meetings of the league.
The Supreme Court very liberally called the league a religious or
charitable society.
In Prince of Peace HospitaP0 there is an inference that a
charter for a corporation of the first class was refused because,
if granted, the work of the hospital for which the charter was
sought would controvert a fixed tenet of the Christian religion ,
but there is also an inference that the decision was based upon a
desire to maintain public decency.
In First Church of Christ, Scientist, 2 the Supreme Court
affirmed the decree refusing a charter to a Christian Science
Church. Though the decision is based upon the reason that the
members of the church proposed to practice medicine without a
license, there is an inference that the maintenance of present-day
Christianity was the real motive for the decision.
THE MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC DECENCY.

In reported opinions from other jurisdictions, judges have
made a great point of sustaining public decency. Who is to determine what is public decency-and by what standard it is to be
weighed, has not been made apparent. Aside entirely from the
statute law, which covers considerable ground under the heading, there seems to be but one reported decision upon the point
in Pennsylvania. This is Prince of Peace Hospital" already referred to. In that case application was -made for a charter for
a corporation intended to maintain a hospital to take care of indigent unmarried women during childbirth. The charter was
refused on the ground that public policy forbids such a public
indecency.
THE PRESERVATION OF THE MARRIAGE RELATION.

The kind of Christianity dispensed by the courts in general,
holds as one of its dearest tenets that marriages are made in
m ii Pa. Dist. Rep.

242 (Iqow).

"See infra, note 52.
"205 Pa. 543 (19o3).
SSupra, note 49.
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heaven. Anything detrimental to the institution of *marriage is
contrary to public policy. Thus a contract not to oppose a divorce suit was held void in Kilborn v. Field," Mr. Justice Sharswood saying:
"Causes for divorce 'being recognized by law' we are to
take it that the true philosophy of life, the ends of justice and
the interests of society, are best promoted by allowing the dissolution for such recognized cause. Courts, however, ought to be
careful to see that all requirements of the law in such proceedings be complied with, both as to form and subscance, so that
divorces may never be obtained through levity or collusion.
Such then being the clear policy of the law, every contract
founded upon a consideration in contravention of it must according to well settled principles be void."
But merely dealing with the domestic relation, if not to its
detriment, is not unlawful. Thus to contract with a stranger to
use only a certain ground for divorce in a suit against one's
spouse is not void.5 5 Nor is a contract to support a married woman who has been deserted by her husband.5 A contract in consideration of past cohabitation to marry a woman and not to desert her is enforcible.5 1
As attorneys are forbidden by statute from testifying to
their clients' secrets, so husbands and wives are forbidden by our
Evidence Act from revealing connubial confidences. But prior
to this act public policy provided the same rule. Mr. Justice
Reed in Hitner'sAppea s said:
"The reason for excluding the husband and wife from
giving evidence either for or against each other is founded
partly on their identity of interests and partly on a principle of
"78 Pa. 94 (1875).

Irwin v. Irwin, x69 Pa. s29 089s).
"MEnders v. Enders, 164 Pa. 266 0894);

"Wyant v. Lesher, 23 Pa. 338 (1854), "Inwhat does the imagined illegality of the consideration of this bond consist? Is it immoral for a seducer
to provide for the victim of his passions and the offspring of their guilt?
illegal for a suitor to propitiate parental consent to a daughter's marriage by
a promise that he will live with and treat her as a kind and affectionate husband ought? It would be a disgrace to our age and generation if the law
compelled an affirmative answer.'

S4 Pa. 1io (867).
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public policy which deems it necessary to guard the security and
confidence of private life even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice."
A contract to devise in restraint of marriage is against public policy1 9 ,
REGULATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS.

By what authority the rules hereafter discussed have been
laid down by the courts has nowhere been made to appear, but
it is certain that public policy has been the excuse for much judicial legislation. It has been thought wise by the judges to enforce a certain code of morality in private business and they have
interfered to the extent of laying down certain standards quite
foreign to the ordinary principles of substantive law. A radical
critic of the Supreme Court decisions bearing upon this subject
would declare that while the interference is wholly unwarranted
and has usually been directed to the support of the predatory
portion of the community, it has not always been unjustifiable.
A conservative critic of these decisions would say that the courts
have not interfered enough. Disinterested consideration of the
decisions leads inevitably to admiration of Adam Smith, for the
doctrine of laisser faire permeates much of the learning on this
branch of our subject. There can be no doubt that interference
with the right of freedom of contract is radical, but the interference exercised by the courts has been reactionary, not radical,
and yet this criticism is more academic thin real for it is hardly
possible to argue in favor of the actions forbidden by public policy.
The following matters have been made the subject of interference: Trade secrets, restraint of trade, combinations and
monopolies, breach of trust, public corporations, wagering, and
life insurance.
It has been held that it would be immoral for a man to learn
the trade secrets of another in that other's employ and then injure him be revealing them. Their narration was not compelled
in Philadelphiav. McManes"0 where Judge Allison said:
" Schaefer v. Senseman, 125 Pa. 310 (1889).
o17 Phila. Rep. 75 (z88s).
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"The discovery or acquirement of a special mode of accomplishing definite results in art or in manufactures or in that
which may be of value to the lawful possessor of such discovery,
may be protected as the special property of the owner, which he
may not be required to reveal to others."
Restraint of trade itself could be made the subject of a much
longer essay than this, but a detailed study of this topic is not
within the scope of this article. We need but briefly to outline
the bearing of public policy on this subject. In Koeler v. Taylor" it was ruled that a restraint of trade, if nothing more ap.
pear, is void. But Mr. Chief Justice Woodward rested his opinion not so much upon public policy as upon the substantive law
giving authority and not reason for his decision.A2 Partial or
limited restraints of trade have always been upheld. Thus to restrain trade in a particular locality is not contrary to public pol4
icy ;e3 nor is a total restraint for a limited time, such as a year.6
In Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co. (5 five
coal companies combined to destroy competition and equalize the
price of coal. One of them having broken the contract, one of
the others endeavored to enforce it. The court, however, refused
to lend its aid and Mr. Justice Agnew, who delivered the opinion,

said:

"The effects produced on the public interests lead to the
consideration of another feature of great weight in determining the illegality of the contract, to wit: the combination resorted to by these five companies. Singly each might have suspended deliveries and sales of coal to suit its own interests, and
might have raised the price, even though this might have been
detrimental to the public interest. There is a certain freedom
which must be allowed to every one in the management of his
own affairs. When competition is left free, individual error or
folly will generally find a correction in the conduct of others.
But here is a combination of all the companies operating in the
"53 Pa. 467 (x866).

nThe opinion of Taylor v. Sensemnan, i1o Pa. St. 3 (885), adds nothing to the discussion, except in so far as it is said that a contract in restraint
of trade is contrary to public policy.

"McCluni's Appeal, 58 Pa. St (1868) ; Kelso v. Reid, 145 Pa. 6D6 (1892);
Patterson v. Glassmire, x66 Pa. 230 0895).
"Fuller v. Hope, 163 Pa. 62 (1894).

"68 Pa. z73 (870.
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Blossburg and Barclay mining regions, and controlling their entire production. They have combined together to govern the
supply and the price of coal in all the markets from the Hudson
to the Mississippi rivers, and from Pennsylvania to the lakes.
This combination has a power in its confederatea iorm wich
no individual action can confer. The public interest must succumb to it, for it has left no competition free to correct its
baleful influence. When the supply of coal is suspended, the
demand for it becomes importunate, and prices must rise. Or
if the supply goes forward, the price fixed by the confederates
must accompany it. The domestic hearth, the fhrnaces of the
iron-master, and the fires of the manufacturer, all feel the restraint, while many dependent hands are paralyzed and hungry
mouths stinted. The influence of a lack of supply or a rise in
the price of an article of such prime necessity, cannot be measured. It permeates the entire mass of community, and leaves
few of its members untouched by its withering blight. Such a
combination is more than a contract, it is an offense."
In Nester v. Brcwing Co.68 upon a similar state of facts Mr.
Chief Justice Sterrett said:
"The test question, in every case like the present, is whether
or not a contract in restraint of trade exists which is injurious
to the public interests. If injurious, it is void a: against puulic policy. Courts will not stop to inquire as to the degree of
injury inflicted. It is enough to know that the natural tendency
of such contracts is injurious. . . ." (Page 23.)
"The appellants insist that restrained trade in the necessaries of life only is within the prohibition of public policy. No
standard has been furnished by which to ascertain what constitutes these with reference to the general public."
The rtle that such a combination is contrary to public policy
extends beyond the mere refusal to enforce the contract of combination. The state will inquire by summary proceedings into
such contracts.67
Breach of trust, even though it involves no crime or civil injury. is contrary to public policy. A contract in consideration
of relinquishing the right to administer a decedent's estate is
void. 68 In Everhart v. Searle6 one Flagg employed a certain
x6i Pa. 473 (1894).
1S
5

Commonwealth v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., 43 Pa. 295 (1862).

Bowers v. Bowers, 26 Pa. 74 (1856).
71 Pa. 256 (1872).

TIlE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

101

Searle to sell some land. Everhart, the plaintiff-in-error, agreed
to pay Searle five hundred dollars "for services in assisting to negotiate a purchase" of the same land. Although the sale was
made at a price higher than Flagg had authorizvd Searle to sell
for, nevertheless the court held that Searle's contract with.Everhart was contrary to public policy.
Public corporations are no more exempt from breach of
trust than private individuals, but the peculiar nature of their
trust perhaps justifies their treatment under a separate heading.
In Crescent Steel Company v. Equitable Gas Company70 a
company incorporated under the Act of May 29 th, 1889, to supply the public with natural gas, entered into a contract to give its
directors and stockholders a preference or priority in the supply.
This was held contrary to public policy because it interfered With
the defendant's duty and could not be enforced.
In Vanderbuilt v. Bennett71 a voting trust agreement between stockholders of a railroad was under consideration. This
the master stigmatized as a combination openly formed for the
purpose of absolutely controlling the interests and policy of a
great public corporation so as to best suit the interests of those
in the scheme, wholly regardless of the interests and rights of the
other stockholders and the welfare of the. public. And Judge
Stowe, in affirming the report, said: "We think that the trust
agreement is absolutely void as contrary to public policy."
Wagering was not illegal per se at common law. The earliest case on the subject in Pennsylvania goes no further than
the common law rule and merely holds that a wager concerning
a human being is void.2 2 Edgell v. McLaughlin7" goes a great
deal further. Mr. Justice Sergeant, in holding no wager can be
recovered on, said:
"When I look back to the character and principles which
actuated our founders and predecessors, I am satisfied they
never countenanced such a principle, but left parties who chose
to embark into contracts of this kind, to recover as they could,
"4o Pitts. L J. (0. S.) 36 (1892).
'6 Pa. C. C. Rep. 193 (887).
Phillips v. Ives, i Rawle, 36 (ixaS).
"6

Vharton, 176 (84p).

-
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according to the code of honor under which they originated;
and that it is derogatory to the character and injurious to the interests of the community, to sanction them. and to employ their
legal tribunals in investigations often indecent, often inflammatory, often impertinent and frivolous, and always useless, if not
noxious in their effects on society."
Since all wagering contracts are contrary to the public policy
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania a fortiori stock gambling
is illegal. In Brua's Appeal7 4 the auditor held that the whole
transaction was gambling and therefore void, but the Supreme
Court said that while it was true that a contract based solely
upon the rise and fall of the market and not contemplating a delivery of the securities presumptively dealt in is void, in this particular case the buyer really purchased shares of stock and the
contract was therefore valid."'
Phillips v. Ives 6 is the basis of the court's interference with
life insurance. In that case a wager was made as to whether Napoleon Bonaparte would escape from St. Helena and this the
court held void because it was a wager concerning human being.
Downey v. Hoffer7 7 is a typical case showing this rule in its full
fruition. It is, namely, that life insurance is void unless there
is an insurable interest. It is beyond our subject to discuss what
is an insurable interest.
Having now considered all the cases dealing with the subject of public policy and endeavored to classify them, we find
that we have traveled in a circle and are confronted with the
Ve have
same question which presented itself at the outset.
seen that definition does not answer this question for it simply
shifts the ground of inquiry. We have endeavored to classify
the authorities, however, and should now be in a position to draw
"55 Pa. 294 (z867).
"Subsequent cases have added but little from the point of view of public
policy though they have added much from the standpoint of stock gambling.
Fareira v. Gabell, 89 Pa. 89 (1879), simply holds that the bona fides of a
transaction in stocks is for the jury; Gaw v. Bennett, 153 Pa. 247 (1893),
turned the dicta of earlier cases into law, the jury having found the note was
void - while Taylor's Estate, 192 Pa. 309 (1899), and Macdonald v. Gt.sler,
2o8 Pa. 177 0904), have really added nothing.

"Supra, note 72.

"rao Pa. iog (885),
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from them generalizations to give a catagorical answer to the
question what is the policy of our courts? It is impossible to
carry the generalization to a single proposition. It may be said
that there are several policies not inconsistent because covering
different subject matters. These will be epitomized in the order
of the analysis of the authorities we .have heretofore made.
The preservation of stable government is a prime object of
judicial solicitude. This end is sought by discouraging traffic in
public office, encouraging the probity of public officials, encouraging the performance of public duties, assuring to public officials
no more and no less than their legal emoluments and protecting
state secrets from revelation. Traffic in public office has been discouraged by refusing judiciOl sanction to all contracts of traffic
in public office whether they be in the form of promises in consideration of election or appointment thereto or of submitting
the title thereto to extra legal decision--even though such decision be asked from court. Probity of public officials has been
encouraged by excluding from judicial consideration and declaring void all contracts tending to the corrtption of public officials even though such cortracts were not made with the officers intended to be corrupted and even though the contracting
parties did not have in view bribery, but merely influence where
such influence was deemed to be undue by the courts before
which the contract was sought to be enforced. The performance of public duties has been encouraged to the extent that any
contract made in consideration of a violation of a public duty
was declared void. Public officials have been assured their legal
emoluments by the refusal of the courts to lend the aid of their
process to any method of increasing them, the diminution thereof
by attachment or sequestration is forbidden by statute in Pennsylvania and is therefore not the subject of judicial policy. State
secrets have been protected from revelation to the extent of refusing the use of legal machinery to those seeking to compel disclosure.
The protection of the administration of justice is another
firmly established policy of our courts. The means by which
this end has been sought have been by overriding all efforts at
obstructing public justice; keeping secret the proceedings of the
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jury room, and excluding material witnesses therefrom, although arbitrators do not seem to share the protection afforded
jurors; and insuring fairness of judicial sales.
Another policy of our courts seems to be the preservation of
present day Christianity. All contracts derogatory thereto are
held void as are legacies or devises to ends tending to its destruction or to bring it into disrepute.
The maintenance of public decency is promoted by placing a
ban upon all transactions which controvert it even though they
do not violate any statute.
The preservation of the marriage relation in its present
status is a well established policy of the court of this Commonwealth. To this end provisions in contracts or wills in restraint
of marriage or encouraging the dissolution of an existing marriage are not enforceable, while settlements of connubial difficulties and transactions tending to preserve or foster marriages
are encouraged.
Finally it is judicial policy to force upon the community a
code of business morality drawn, indeed, from no authoritive
source, but generally in accord with public opinion. To accomplish this end, the -rievelation of trade secrets will not be compelled; legal sanction is refused to all unreasonable restraints of
trade; combinations looking toward monopoly are not only not
enforceable, but are subject of inquiry and prohibition at the
suit of the State; breach of trust whether by an individual or by
a private or public corporation renders all contracts in consideration thereof void; the creation of corporations Tor immoral,
illegal or improper purposes will not be permitted, nor may any
corporation enact by-laws contrary to accepted theories of morality and ethics; and wagering in any form is forbidden. Under
the prohibition of wagers, stock gambling and life insurance,
where there is no insurable -interest may be classified.
Graham C. Woodward.
Philadelphia.

